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Among Aristotle’s many contributions to the development of 
civilization his contributions to the development of science seem to be 
most prominent. There are few disciplines that do not originate, in one 
way or another, in the works of the Stagirite1. It is so because it was 
Aristotle who showed how it is possible to form knowledge about that 
which is contingent, thus opening the gates for broadly understood 
scientific consideration of nature. For his master, Plato, knowledge of 
the contingent was a contradiction of terms: according to him one can 
have knowledge of that which is immutable and eternal, i.e., of true 
substances: ideas and mathematical entities. By contrast, contingent 
reality can at best be a source of true opinion (doxa), the cognitive value 
of which is limited by particular conditions of experience: a particular 
statement is true only here and now2. For this reason the corporeal 
world as such cannot be the subject of knowledge, since it is mutable 
and, therefore, contingent in its being. Consequently, natural science is 
impossible, and so the analysis of natural phenomena is for Plato, as it 
was for Socrates3, a waste of time. Aristotle, who spent twenty years in 
the Academia, knew well that Plato was no naturalist4 but he did not 
                                                          
* Editor's note: the notes in this text are presented as footnotes. The author has chosen 
to diverge from the standard of this periodical, because quoted material comes from 
unpublished manuscripts.  
1 Mathematics and history are the two to which Aristotle made hardly any 
contribution. 
2 Plato, Republic, 476 C-477 D. 
3 Plato, Phaedo, 95 E-99 D. 
4 Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, 315a, 30-33. 
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want to follow his footsteps. On the contrary, he wanted to prove Plato 
wrong with respect to nature and to show that the physical world can 
be an object of scientific inquiry, too.  
The contingent character of beings of the physical world is 
manifested in their temporal character5. Here we can see two aspects, 
referring to beings the existence of which has time limits (in contrast to 
eternal beings) and to processes of change occurring in time (in 
contrast to instantaneous changes). Even in the superlunary world, 
eternal and immutable as it is in its substance for Aristotle, we can see 
something that is changing: indeed, it is the very measure of change, 
namely the local motion of heavenly bodies6. In their revolutions, the 
heavenly spheres are not limited merely to measuring the processes 
taking place in the sublunary world – they are governing them through 
influencing the generation and corruption on all levels of being: from 
transmutations of elements to physiological changes affecting the 
emotions of people7. Only the intellect, being immaterial, remains 
independent of those influences. On the contrary, it is itself able to 
govern emotions, by making them conform to the standards of behavior 
carefully established by reason as a golden mean between the opposing 
extremities8. As a result, we can speak of three realms of natural 
phenomena, characterized by specific varieties of change: changes 
concerning inanimate bodies, changes concerning animate bodies, and 
changes concerning souls. In all three we encounter all four Aristotelian 
types of change: substantial, qualitative, quantitative, and local9, but 
they are understood in the light of each of these aspects of nature.  
                                                          
5 Aristotle, Physics, 200b, 10-12. 
6 Aristotle, De caelo, 287a, 25-30. 
7 Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, 337a, 1-5. The statement that stars influence 
proportions of elementary qualities, which affect humoral composition and hence 
emotions is attributed to Aristotle, even though he does not say it expressly in any of 
his texts. This inference was made by Ptolemy of Alexandria in his Tetrabiblos and 
became a part of Aristotelian tradition. Cf. E. Grant, Planets, Stars and Orbs. The 
Medieval Cosmos 1200-1687, Cambridge 1994, pp. 571-573. 
8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a. 
9 Aristotle’s theoretical exposition of local motion is presented at length in Physics, 
while the remaining three types of change are rather briefly discussed in De 
generatione et corruptione.  
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In such a way, a natural philosopher is able to form a complex 
classification of phenomena allowing him to analyze various contingent 
facts concerning the world. Out of this multitude, we have decided to 
select three phenomena: local motion will serve as an example for the 
study of change in inanimate bodies, temperaments – as an example for 
the study of change in animate bodies, and virtues – as an example for 
the study of change in souls10. In all three cases, Aristotle is trying to 
present a scientific analysis of a phenomenon by trying to define a state 
(Greek hexis, Latin habitus) that is somehow related to the 
phenomenon, either as its end or its duration, so that he can get 
something tangible, or substance-like, to focus on. Although in 
Categories he mentions it as a separate category only briefly 11, he 
speaks of state mostly with respect to three other accidental categories: 
passion, relation, and quality12. The definition of it, which he gives in 
book Lambda of Metaphysics, refers to state as a kind of process 
towards a disposition, its part or perfection, thus underlining in what 
way this category can be applied in analyzing change. A process entails 
successive parts that can be compared with (or related to) one 
another13. Since his approach was widely imitated in scholastic 
philosophy (in a way it is still being used even in our times), we shall 
supplement examples taken from Aristotle with their counterparts 
taken from medieval authors. 
 
 Local motion 
For Aristotle local motion was a complex issue. It is first divided 
into circular, which is proper for the heavens, and rectilinear, which is 
proper for the sublunary world. The latter is further divided according 
to two criteria: its character or direction. The former specifies whether 
motion is natural or violent, the latter encompasses six primary 
directions (up, down, right, left, forward, backward), of which the first 
pair is most important, because it characterizes natural motions of 
                                                          
10 The second and third are treated as states belonging to the category of quality 
(Aristotle, Categories, 8b, 28-30), the first, as states belonging to the category of place.  
11 Aristotle, Categories, 2a, 1-2. 
12 Aristotle, Categories, 8b, 9a-b. 
13 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1022b, 3-10. 
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sublunary bodies: gravitation of the heavy ones and levitation of the 
light ones. Yet another distinction refers to the velocity of motion: it is 
constant for motions in which a body is traversing the same distance in 
every unit of time, or it can vary by being slower (deceleration) or 
faster (acceleration) in subsequent units of time. This set of criteria 
allows Aristotle to distinguish a number of types of motion, each of 
which is treated as a species in the category of passion (Greek paschein, 
Latin passio), to which motion belongs14. Thus he is able to formulate 
general statements about motion with help of universal concepts 
concerning them. These concepts possess validity only when one 
assumes that individual motions necessarily follow the same rules, 
which are expressed as proportions of constituent qualities 
characterizing motion: force, resistance, distance and time.  
When we try to analyze motion from the point of view of the 
Aristotelian theory seeing it as a move from privation to habitus, or the 
other way round, there seem to be two ways of approaching local 
motion. Either it is a privation of a natural place, the achievement of 
which gives it rest, or it is rest which is privation of change and then 
motion is nothing but all the states (habitus) of that change15. The 
former approach analyzes that aspect of motion, in which we are 
interested in completion of action, and therein motion is understood as 
belonging to the same category as the form that is achieved at its end 
(place or, in case of other types of change, a quality or a quantity); the 
latter is an approach in which we are interested in action as such, and 
then motion belongs to the category of passion. It was Avicenna who 
first noted that the two approaches are different and Albert the Great, a 
thinker distinguished for his work in the reception of Greek and Arabic 
natural philosophy in early 13th century Latin Europe, called the former 
forma fluens, or the formal aspect of motion, and the latter fluxus 
formae, or the material aspect of motion. Avicenna’s distinction 
between the two aspects of motion was taken over and popularized 
                                                          
14 Aristotle, Categories, 6b. 
15 Aristotle, Physics, 188b 3-10. 
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already by Averroeos, even though he himself believed that the proper 
understanding of motion is the formal one16.  
Averroes’s understanding of the problem of local motion is 
visible in the writings of a Parisian Latin Averroist active at the turn of 
the 14th century, John of Jandun. In his commentary on Physics, John of 
Jandun is no different from other Aristotelians of his times in treating 
motion as a phenomenon which can be found in three types of change: 
local, qualitative and quantitative. His understanding of motion in three 
categories is convergent with the communis opinio doctorum. In all 
three, motion is an imperfect act17. It is an act, because it refers to 
something that used to be in potency and cannot be a pure potency. 
Motion is also a form that is different both from agent and patient, even 
though it is not independent from them18. Before any action starts, 
things are in potency. What comes between potency and a perfect act is 
motion. Accordingly, motion can be understood in two ways: in one 
way, as a flowing form (forma fluens), it is different from its end only 
inasmuch as it is somewhat less perfect than it. In the other way, it is 
understood as continuous flux of a form (fluxus formae)19. In his 
questions to Metaphysics, Jandun says that, according to Averroes, of the 
two opinions about motion the former is truer, the latter, more famous. 
Fluxus formae describes motion as belonging to the category of passion, 
forma fluens – as belonging to the category of the subject of motion. In 
the latter sense, it is not subject to quantity, because it is in many 
                                                          
16 M. Gensler, Kłopotliwa zmiana, czyli Waltera Burleya zmagania ze zmiennością 
rzeczy, Łódź 2007, pp. 32-33. 
17 Johannes de Janduno, Subtilissimae quaestiones in octo libros Aristotelis de physico 
auditu, Venetiis 1544, V, Q. 3, f. 71 vb: “Caliditas enim fluens quae praecedit terminum 
calefactionis non differt a caliditate quae terminat motum nisi sicut minus perfectum 
et magis perfectum”. 
18 Ibidem, III, Q 4, f. 40va: “Dicitur communiter quod motus est immediate subiectum 
actionis et passionis (...), ergo motus est prior naturaliter actione et passione. Si 
quidem subiectum natura prius est accidente, ergo ipse motus prius producitur ab 
agente quam actio et passio. (...) Dico quod immo ipse motus bene dependet ab agente 
per se. (...) Et patet faciliter, quia omni potentiae per se activae correspondet potentia 
per se passiva et e converso”.  
19 Ibidem, V, Q. 3, f. 71 vb – 72 ra: “Nomen motus significat illa duo aequivoce vel 
analogicae, quorum unum est sicut materia, vel ad modum materiae quoquo modo, 
scilicet forma quae fluit, et alterum ad modum formae, scilicet fluxus formae”. Cf. also 
M. Gensler, op. cit., pp. 162-3, note 289 sq. 
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categories and is not different from the terminus of motion. In the 
former sense, it is subject to quantity, because it is composed of parts of 
the same character (eiusdem rationis) conjoined with one another20.  
John of Jandun follows Averroes in his preference for the “truer 
opinion”, when he states that rest is a state of completion, since motion 
ceases when the habits are present in matter21. However, he makes use 
of the “more famous opinion”, too, when he notes that rest, which is a 
privation, cannot be compared directly to motion. That something does 
not have a quality means only that it may have that quality. 
Consequently, in order to explain how a quality may be obtained, he 
distinguishes two kinds of patients: those which are not disposed or 
contrarily disposed to the agent (e.g. water to fire), and those which are 
disposed to the agent (e.g. transparent medium to light); in the first 
case there is motion, in the other, change is instantaneous22. In motion 
                                                          
20 Johannes de Janduno, Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae, Venetiis 1553 
(repr. Minerva, Frankfurt/Main 1966), V, Q 19, f. 65rb: “Motus accipitur duobus 
modis: uno modo pro forma imperfecta quae fluit et tendit ad ulteriorem 
perfectionem; alio modo accipitur pro via ad perfectionem, quae via est fluxus. Et sic 
sunt duae viae de motu, prima est verior, secunda est famosior, ut dicit Commentator, 
tertio Physicorum. (...) Capiendo motum primo modo, sic motus universaliter non est 
quantitas. Et ratio est, illud quod est in diversis praedicamentis non est simpliciter 
quantitas, quia tria praedicamenta non sunt unum praedicamentum simpliciter. (...) 
Sed motus pro forma fluente est huiusmodi, quia capiendo motum pro forma fluente 
non differt a termino motus nis secundum magis et minus perfectum. (...) Secundo 
dicendum quod capiendo motum secundo modo, sic est quantitas, et ratio est, omnis 
forma quae est divisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis per se copulatas ad communem 
terminum est continua quantitas”.  
21 Johannes de Janduno, Subtilissimae quaestiones..., VI, Q. 7, f. 82 vb: “Habitibus 
praesentibus in materia cessat motus”. This is a famous quotation from Aristotle’s De 
generatione et corruptione, 324b, 14-17, which became a stock phrase mentioned in 
florilegia (collections of useful quotations), popular sources of easy erudition, e.g. 
Auctoritates Aristotelis. Cf. J. Hamesse (ed.), Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège 
medieval. Etude historique et édition critique, Louvain-Paris 1974. 
22 Ibidem, III, Q. 4, f. 40rb - vb: “Quia sicut quiescens significat per modum activi, sic et 
movens et e converso, sed dissimile est in hoc quod ipsa quies, cum sit quaedam 
privatio, non comparatur proprie ad aliquid ut ad efficiens, sed solum ut ad subiectum. 
(...) Ad aliud potest dici quod actio non est in agente formaliter et subiective, id est 
tamquam in subiecto suo, cui inhaeret, sed solum effective vel finaliter, id est 
tamquam in efficiente vel tamquam in suo fine propter illa quae primaria intentione 
agunt propter se. (...) Relatio nova fit in aliquo subiecto per motum et 
transmutationem, ut si quis transmutatur ad albedinem quam prius non habebat, 
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understood in general, a part is obtained after a part23. In local motion, 
it means that a body occupies a number of positions (ubi), which are of 
the same genus essentially (each belongs to the category of place), even 
though they are specifically different (each is distinguished by its own 
positioning in relation to others)24. This makes it possible to compare 
them with one another. 
The opinion that local motion can be analyzed in a quantitative 
way when approached as belonging to the category of passion was 
taken over and elaborated by later scholastics. It achieved its most 
developed form in the writings of English authors belonging to the so-
called Oxford School of Calculators in the first half of the 14th century. 
Richard Kilvington, one of the founders of the school, analyzed motion 
                                                                                                                                                   
certum est quod ab illo agente sit similis alteri albo, et per motum illum aliquo modo, 
quia numquam fieret esse similis sine motu. (...) De numero eorum quae sunt ab 
agentibus per se duo sunt genera. Quaedam enim sunt ad quae subiectum passivum 
non est summe dispositum, immo habet contrariam dispositionem ad illa, ut igne 
appropinquanto aquae, ipsa aqua non est summe disposita ad caliditatem perfectam, 
immo habet contrariam dispositionem. Et talia forte sunt ab agentibus mediantibus 
motibus et transmutationibus subiectorum et ita, scilicet agente approximato passo, 
non statim recipiuntur ab agente non passo, sed oportet esse tempus medium et 
motus in tempore. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae ipsa subiecta sive passiva statim sunt 
disposita sufficienter et non habent dispositionem contrariam ad ea, sicut diaphanum 
ad receptionem luminis, et talia bene fiunt ab agente per se non mediante motu 
medio”. 
23 Ibidem, III, Q. 2, f. 38vb-39ra: “Motus non est quicumque actus imperfectus, sed 
actus imperfectus existens in subiecto tendente continue et fluente ad ulterius 
complementum quantum ad motum intensionis vel ad ulteriorem diminutionem 
quantum ad motum remissionis. Ista autem tendentia continua ad ulteriorem 
perfectionem non est de essentia motus, qui est actus imperfectus, sed est aliquid 
necessario requisitum ad motum. (...) Hoc nomen motus famosius accipitur pro fluxu 
sive tendentiam quam pro ipsa forma imperfecta, cuius pars generatur post parte”.  
24 Ibidem, III, Q. 6, f. 41va-b: “Via ad terminum non est eiusdem essentiae cum illo 
termino, (...) sed motus qui est fluxus formae est via ad ipsum terminum ad quem, ut 
manifestum est, quia mediante huius fluxu mobile pervenit usque ad terminum ad 
quem. (...) Iste fluxus formae qui est motus secundum opinionem famosiorem est de 
genere passionis. (...) Sed terminus motus est de genere substantiae, vel quantitatis, 
vel qualitatis, vel ubi. (...) Aliqui autem dicunt quod fluxus ipse, ut est quid continuum, 
est de genere quantitatis. (...) Sed dubium est de motu locali, quo modo fit idem cum 
termino ad quem. (...) Forte dicendum quod talis motus, si esset, non esset idem 
secundum speciem cum termino ad quem, sed esset idem essentialiter secundum 
genus. Nam in eodem genere sunt ubi sursum et ubi deorsum”. 
Marek Gensler 
Habitus or the Possibility of the Science of the Contingent 
[28] 
in terms of potency. He was interested both in the active potency, i.e., 
the power needed for a motion to begin, and the passive potency, i.e., 
the resistance offered by the medium in motion of an object. In the first 
case, he tried to establish the values of the states known as maximum 
quod sic (the greatest resistance that can be overcome by the power 
needed to end the stasis of the body) and minimum quod non (the 
lowest value of resistance that is sufficient to prevent motion). 
Kilvington, who inherited the problem from Averroes and John of 
Jandun, was able to prove, by means of calculus of compounding ratios, 
that it is impossible to give the value of active potency by means of the 
maximum quod sic, yet it is possible to do so by means of the minimum 
quod non. With respect to the passive potency, he showed, again with 
the help of the calculus, that resistance of a body can be overcome even 
by an infinitely small agent when it acts over an infinitely long time25. 
This way he elegantly proved the truth of the old proverb saying that 
gutta cavat lapidem non vi sed saepe cadendo. 
Once the understanding of motion as belonging to the category 
of passion was well established, the quantitative comparison of various 
specific forms it obtained was made possible. William Heytesbury, who 
belonged to the second generation of Calculators, compared fast and 
slow motions using the distinction of habit and privation. He presents 
velocity as motion from privation of speed (tarditas) to speed in 
perfection (velocitas), in which we can measure the magnitude of 
various forms of velocity against one another. Since they belong to the 
same genus, slowness and velocity are just names for one and the same 
phenomenon, the specific forms (i.e. habits) of which can be 
compared26.  
                                                          
25 E. Jung-Palczewska, Między filozofią przyrody a nowożytnym przyrodoznawstwem. 
Ryszard Kilvington i fizyka matematyczna w średniowieczu, Łódź 2002, pp. 71-75. Cf. 
also Eadem, Richard Kilvington on local motion, in: P.J.J.M. Bakker (ed.) Essays in Honor 
of Zenon Kaluza, Brepols, Paris 2002, pp. 3-18. 
26 Guillelmus Heytesbury, Regulae solvendi sophismata, Venetiis 1494, f. 38va: 
“Tarditas enim est quasi privatio velocitatis non obstante quod de virtute sermonis 
omnis tarditas est velocitas et econverso, sicut quaelibet parvitas est magnitudo, et 
universaliter ab habitu et perfectione sua denominanda est res quaecunque habens 
illam”. I would like to thank Robert Podkoński for drawing my attention to this 
passage.  
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 Temperaments 
Aristotle’s theory of four temperaments derives from his 
fundamental physical concept of four elements (fire, air, water, and 
earth), which can transmute into one another. All sublunary bodies are 
made up of a mixture of them. The proportions of elements decide 
which of the primary qualities (hotness, coldness, dryness and 
humidity) that characterize them dominate in the composite thus 
affecting the qualities of the body27. Since these qualities are derived 
from the primary ones, they reflect their quadripartite character in a 
more or less direct way. Of all living creatures humans possess the best 
harmonized mixture of elements, which makes it possible for their 
bodies to be informed by the most noble kind of soul, the intellectual 
one. Nevertheless, even in humans one can observe individual 
variations of temperaments resulting from a relative domination of one 
of the four bodily fluids (humors), which are responsible for various 
physiological processes sustaining the body28. Even though the 
proportion of humors constantly changes in every individual depending 
on the diet, climate, season, constellation and other factors, everyone 
has his or her natural disposition (habitus) for a particular 
temperament. This particular temperament is a consequence of a 
unique composition of form (provided by the father), matter (provided 
by the mother) and the generative influence of the sun (for later 
authors also the planets) in the moment of conception (or birth)29. By 
presenting a temperament as a relation of a set of constituent qualities 
Aristotle is able to treat it as a proportion an discuss it much in the 
same way as he does with respect to other types of motions.  
In his Physics questions, John of Jandun elaborates on Aristotle’s 
opinion concerning variations in temperaments in terms of relations. 
According to him, an alteration towards a corporeal habitus, like health 
or illness, is not a proper alteration, because it is with respect to 
something external, i.e., the elementary qualities of hotness and 
coldness, dryness and humidity, and thus is more like a relation, since 
there is a motion from one contrariety to another. For instance, health 
                                                          
27 Aristotle, De coelo, 270a, 29-33. 
28 Aristotle, Problemata, XXX, 953b – 954a. 
29 Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, 336a-b; Physics, 194b, 13-14. 
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is a quality which is a resultant of the degree of elementary qualities in 
the humors, and since it is funded as a disposition in their proportion, 
the change towards health is in fact a change of a relation between the 
humors. And such an alteration is not an essential alteration but an 
accidental one, because it results from alterations in hotness, coldness, 
etc. There is, however, a proper alteration concerning temperaments, 
namely changes in humors themselves; it refers to actual heating and 
cooling which take place in blood, phlegm, bile and black bile as a result 
of digestion of various types of food and drink. For this reason, people 
of various complexions, viz. choleric, sanguine, melancholic or 
phlegmatic, react differently to the changes in food and drink. For 
instance, cholerics cannot drink too much, because the hotness of the 
drink increases their natural heat, already high in people of that 
temperament, too much, which may cause a disease. Conversely, their 
passions are moderated when their bodies are cooled thanks to an 
appropriate diet30.  
                                                          
30 Johannes de Janduno, Subtilissimae quaestiones..., VII, Q. 7, f. 93rb - vb: “Qualitates de 
prima specie qualitatis sunt habitus et dispositiones. Habitus autem quidam sunt 
corporis, ut sanitas et aegritudo. (...) Et quidam sunt habitus animae, et isti sunt 
duplices, quia quidam sunt in parte animae intellectivae, (…) scilicet intellectus, 
scientia, prudentia, et ars. Alii sunt habitus in parte opposita, sive in appetitu , et isti 
dicuntur morales et sunt omnes virtutes morales. (...) Dicitur communiter quod istae 
qualitates possunt considerari dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad suas essentias, et sic 
sunt in genere qualitatis relationis; alio modo posssunt considerari quantum ad 
aliquas proprietates consequentes eas, et sic sunt ad aliquid, sicut ipsam sanitatem 
consequitur quidam respectus ad bene operandum opera naturalia. (…) Isti habitus 
corporis, quamvis secundum essentias suas sint entia absoluta et non ad aliquid, 
tamen consequuntur immediate quasdam relations et fundant in ipsis relationibus, 
sicut in dispositionibus et praeparationibus sine quibus non possunt esse. Verbi 
gratia, sanitas consequitur immediate commensurationem seu proportionem debitam 
calidorum, frigidorum, humidorum, et siccorum ad invicem. (…) Et est attendendum 
quod licet alteratio proprie dicta non sit per se ad istas qualitates, scilicet ad habitus 
corporis, est tamen ad eas alteratio quoddam modo per accidens. Nam acceptio vel 
remotio sanitatis consequitur alterationem proprie dictam, verbi gratia calefactionem 
vel frigefactionem, et alias huiusmodi, ut manifestum est per experimentum et sciunt 
medici. (…) Moderatio passionum potest bene consequi aliquam alterationem corporis 
proprie dictam. Cum enim aliquis moderate calidus est, (…) tunc ipse magis moderate 
irascitur. Et si quis est multum excellenter supercalefactus a corde aut a sanguine, 
difficile aut impossibile est ipsum moderare iram. Unde homines cholerici sunt magis 
irascibiles et iracundi caeteris. Unde si in homine cholerico debet refrenari et 
Marek Gensler 
Habitus or the Possibility of the Science of the Contingent 
[31] 
Walter Burley, an English philosopher little younger than 
Jandun31, made extensive use of the Aristotelian pair: habit / privation 
in his commentary on Aristotle’s On senses and sensible things belonging 
to the collection of small treaties about nature, known as Parva 
naturalia. For Burley, the properties of living beings can be the subject 
of scientific inquiry if we analyze them as belonging to the category of 
state. This refers not only to fundamental characteristics, such as life 
and death, but also qualities, passions and states, such as health and 
illness, anger and desire, or awakenness and sleep. Arranging those 
properties in contrastive pairs helps to present a systematic description 
of them. Consequently, Burley is able to identify certain natural 
phenomena as specific states of a particular disposition or 
temperament32. This way, in the commentary on De somno, belonging to 
the same collection, he can explain that, e.g., epilepsy is a state which 
seldom affects people of melancholic character, because for him 
epilepsy is a pathological form of sleep, while melancholy induces 
                                                                                                                                                   
moderari ira, necesse est eius corpus fieri minus calidum aliqualiter. Propter hoc 
bonum est cholericis abstinere a cibariis acute caliditatis ex quibus generatur sanguis 
multum calidus et spiritus”. 
31 Burley came to Paris in 1308, two years before Jandun left it. Cf. M. Gensler, Walter 
Burley on the Influence of the Planets, in: M.C. Pacheco, J.F. Merinhos (eds.), 
Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos 23 (2004). Intellect and Imagination in Medieval 
Philosophy, Porto 2004, p. 83. 
32 Gualterus Burley, Commentarius in librum De sensu et sensato, Ms London, Lambeth 
Palace, f. 175 rb-va: “Sensus, memoria, ira, desiderium, somnus et vigilia, iuventus, 
senectus, inspiratio, expiratio, mors et vita sunt passiones totius coniuncti. (...) 
quaedam insunt omni animali et quaedam insunt omni viventi, et quaedam alicui et 
non omni. Sensus, memoria, ira, desiderium, et omnino appetitus, super gaudium et 
tristitia - ista inveniuntur in omnibus animalibus, ut dicit Philosophus, et dicit ‘fere’, 
quia memoria non inest nisi animalibus perfectis. Unde libro De animalibus dicit quod 
memoria non inest carentibus cerebro, nec ira inest carentibus felle, adhuc sunt 
quattuor coniugationes passionum quarum quaedam insunt omni animali et soli 
quaedam insunt soli et non omni, et quaedam insunt omni et non soli. Somnus et 
vigilia insunt omni animali et soli animali. Expiratio et inspiratio insunt soli animali et 
non omni, nam inspiratio et expiratio non inveniuntur nisi in habentibus pulmonem. 
Iuventus et senectus insunt omni animali et non soli animali, quia omnibus animatis. 
Similiter mors et vita, quorum unum est ut privatio et aliud ut habitus, insunt omni 
animali et non soli, quia insunt omni animato”. 
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sleeplessness33. Sleep is thus a habit, which is formed as a result of a 
relation of the temperament to the external conditions, most of all the 
diet. A naturalist or a physician, who knows the temperament of the 
patient can adjust the diet to eliminate the problems caused by too 
much or too little sleep.  
 
 Virtues 
Even though it belongs to ethics, which is a part of practical 
philosophy, Aristotelian doctrine of virtues is linked to natural 
philosophy through the theory of the soul. A virtue is seen as a “golden 
mean” between opposing natural inclinations of the sensual part of the 
                                                          
33 Gualterus Burley, Commentarius in libros De somno, I.7, Ms London, Lambeth Palace, 
f. 166 va – 167 ra: “Quod autem evaporatio ascendens ad caput sit causa somni 
probatur per septem. Signum primum est illa: quae sunt multum evaporantia 
inducunt multum somnum, ut vinum, lolium, mandragora; et hoc est signum quod 
evaporatio est causa somni. Mandragora est arbor cuius cortex, si teratur et misceatur 
cum vino vel cum aliquo liquore potabili et detur alicui ad bibendum, ipse redditur 
insensibilis et propter hoc talis potus datur eis ad bibendum, quorum corda debent 
secari vel uri. Tales enim fiunt per potum illum quasi insensibiles, nec sentiunt 
dolorem propter fortitudinem somni. (…) Tertium signum est quod quaedam 
aegritudines quae fiunt ex materia calida et humida inducunt multum somnum 
propter multam evaporationem provenientem ex humida superfluitate et calida, cuius 
sunt febris et letargia, et hoc est signum quod evaporatio est causa somni: letargia est 
passio cerebri inducens oblivionem, quam patiuntur illi qui nihil possunt memoriter 
retinere. Quartum signum quod somnus causatur ex evaporatione ascendente ad 
superiora est quod pueri qui constituti sunt in prima aetate, magis dormiunt quam 
quando sunt in alia aetate. (…). Et propter hoc est, quia est tanta abundantia 
humiditatis et tot vapores ascendunt in pueris, ideo epilentia accidit saepius 
constitutis in puerili aetate quam quando sunt in alia aetate, et hoc est signum quod in 
pueris est multa evaporatio. Epilentia est aegritudo causata ex magna superfluitate 
ascendete ad superiora qua ingrossata descendit inferius per vias respirationis et 
obturrat venas exspirationis et deficiente exspiratione moritur animal. Causa quorum 
primum fiunt epilentici est quia epilentia videtur esse quidam somnus. Est enim 
impotentia sentiendi causata ex evaporatione. (…) Septimum signum est quod 
melancholici non sunt somnolenti. Et hoc est, quia sunt frigidi et sicci, et sunt multum 
edates. Ex hiis potest colligi quod evaporatio ascendens ex nutrimento ad cerebrum et 
rectum descendens, efficit impotentiam sensus qui est somnus. Ex istis infertur 
definitio somni, et est quod somnus est conventus caloris ad interius et eiusdem 
naturalis reciprocatio propter causam praedictam, scilicet propter evaporationes 
frigiditate cerebri condensatas descendentes modo prius dicto”. 
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soul34. The golden mean is discovered by reason and later established 
as a disposition of the soul through habituation. As a habit, virtue 
belongs to the category of relation35. Consequently, it can be analyzed 
using the same methodological approach as in the analysis of motion or 
temperaments. We are not surprised, then, that in establishing what is a 
virtue, Aristotle presents it as a kind of proportion of the middle to the 
opposite extremities36. This enables him to tackle such issues as growth 
and weakening of virtue: they are processes, in which successive parts 
can be compared with one another.  
Medieval Latin philosophers, who studied the ethical theory of 
Aristotle, had no reservations about his presentation of it. Following the 
scholastic fashion, they tried only to present it in a still more consistent 
way. This is why in his discussions concerning virtue, contained in 
questions 49 to 67 of Summa theologiae I.II, Thomas Aquinas analyses 
first the nature of habitus, pointing that although Aristotle associated it 
with several categories, it should be properly seen as belonging to the 
category of quality37. He explains that it is such a kind of quality, which 
always presented in relation to something38, in most cases some action 
or passion39. Most habits are formed by actions gradually, either in the 
proper sense or accidentally40. Virtue, which is a perfection of rational 
powers of a man, is formed as a disposition, because they are not 
naturally inclined in one direction41. Its subject, in case of moral virtues, 
is in the irascible and appetitive powers of the sensual soul42. This 
description of virtue allows Aquinas to discuss an array of issues 
concerning it, from the number of virtues and their types to the 
relations between them and other passions in man.  
                                                          
34 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1127a, 1103b. 
35 Aristotle, Topics, 124b. 
36 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1133b; Politics, 1295a. 
37 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I.II, q. 49, art. 1, Responsio. 
38 Ibidem, q. 49, art. 2, Ad rationes. 
39 Ibidem, q. 49, art. 3, Responsio. 
40 Ibidem, q. 52, art. 1. He refers here to a comment Aristotle makes with reference to 
health and illness as related to changes in proportions of natural heat and coldness in 
his Physics, book 7, 246b, 3; 248a, 6. 
41 Ibidem, q. 55, art. 1, Responsio, and 3, Responsio. 
42 Ibidem, q. 56, art. 4, Responsio. 
Marek Gensler 
Habitus or the Possibility of the Science of the Contingent 
[34] 
John of Jandun is not entirely satisfied with Aquinas’s 
interpretation of virtue as a habit belonging to the category of quality. 
However, it is not because he denies it is a quality, but because he 
believes that as a quality it is an indivisible perfection, and so it cannot 
possess successive parts43. Accordingly, for him alteration of a moral 
habitus is not a proper one, because if a virtue is a perfection, it is 
unable to receive degrees: someone achieves a virtue only when he (or 
she) has attained the highest degree of a moral disposition, just like the 
heat of fire has only the maximal heat. This is because a proper 
perfection is indivisible as such. For a moral virtue to form in the 
sensitive appetite it is necessary either to remove (for Stoics) or 
diminish (for Aristotle) sensual passions, i.e., motions in the sensitive 
appetite caused by fantasy. This is why such an alteration in moral 
habitus is only an accidental one44. Still this does not make it impossible 
for the philosopher to study virtue and its growth or weakening.  
 
                                                          
43 Jandun’s objection refers to the same passage in Aristotle’s Physics, book 7, which is 
cited by Aquinas in question 52, art. 1; cf. note 40 above.  
44 Johannes de Janduno, Subtilissimae quaestiones..., VII, Q. 7, f. 93va - 94va: “Ad habitus 
qui sunt in parte appetitiva, scilicet ad virtutes morales, non est alteratio proprie dicta 
per se primo, quia nihil alteratur dum accipit propriam virtutem, et sic secundum 
virtutem propriam non est alteratio. Maior probatur, quia motus non est ad illud vel 
secundum illud quod est indivisibile, et dico motus proprie dictus qui est continuus. 
Sed omnis propria perfectio inquantum huiusmodi est indivisibilis, sicut caliditas in 
summo secundum est propria perfectio ignis. (...) Aliquid esse maxime perfectum 
potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo secundum actum, alio modo secundum potentiam 
propinquissimam. (...) Cum enim aliquis habet virtutem propriam, est in potentia 
propinquissima ad actum qui est eius maxima perfectio. (...) Quod licet ad ipsas 
virtutes morales non sit per se alteratio proprie dicta, tamen ad eas est alteratio 
quoddam modo per accidens. Nam ad acceptionem virtutis moralis in appetitu 
sensitivo requiritur aut totalis remotio passionum, secundum stoicos, aut saltem 
moderatio seu modificatio earum, secundum Aristotelem. (...) Qualiter autem virtus 
moralis generetur in appetitu sensitivo, utrum tota simul aut per pars post partem, 
bona inquisitio est. (...) Hic videtur consequi quod non acquiritur continue pars 
virtutis post partem, quia sic esset vera propria alteratio, nisi quod aliqui dicunt quod 
ad hoc requiritur aliud, scilicet quod qualitas sit sensibilis quae acquiritur et 
subiectum sit per eam sensibile. Sed puto quod ad alterationem proprie dictam bene 
sufficeret continua acquisitio unius partis post aliam partem illius qualitatis ad quam 
est alteratio, ibi enim esset verus motus”.  
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 Conclusion 
Although Aristotle was opposing Plato when he declared that 
natural science is possible, he was concordant with him in the opinion 
that in order to deserve its name knowledge of nature must be 
immutable and necessary, even though its subjects are temporary and 
contingent. When we look at the variety of contingent phenomena 
which are the subject of a scientific analysis for Aristotle and his 
scholastic followers, and the way they are analyzed, we can see that 
Aristotle applies two research tools which help him isolate the 
immutable elements of phenomena. The first and more general one is 
the concept of category, the application of which makes it possible for 
him to introduce an elaborate taxonomy of kinds of being in the form of 
a hierarchy, which starts with species and ends in the concept of being 
as such. This tool, however, is useful only for the analysis of that which 
is, but not that which changes, which is a property characterizing many, 
if not most, natural beings. Here Aristotle applies the other tool, which 
has a profoundly Platonic character: proportion. No one would dare to 
question the scientific character of geometry, the study of proportions. 
Consequently, if in the analysis of a natural issue one is able to show 
that there are proportions, which is the endeavor taken by Aristotle and 
his scholastic followers, then the knowledge of those proportions is as 
scientific as the study of proportions in triangles. That which is an 
equivalent of triangles in the study of natural processes is habitus or 
state. No matter whether we apply this tool to local motion of inanimate 
bodies, or changes in body humors, or growth or weakening of a virtue, 
everywhere we are following the same procedure. We identify the 
process by means of establishing its termini, or extremes, and then we 
compare particular states in relation to them. This allows us to establish 
a set of proportions which invariably characterize particular stages of 
processes. This way a contingent habit becomes eternalized in its 
relations and a true knowledge of them can be achieved. Thus science of 
the contingent is formed.  
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Most of sciences can be traced back to Aristotle. This is because in 
opposition to Plato he was able to find a way in which one could give a 
scientific form to reflection concerning contingent facts of every-day 
life. Knowledge of the contingent was made possible thanks to the 
Aristotelian concepts of category and state (habitus). It is the latter 
concept that was especially important for forming knowledge about 
change. Aristotle and his medieval followers apply it in analyses of 
various processes, from local motion to changes in temperaments, to 
formation of virtues.  
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